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Berry: Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Police Conduct Shall Not Be Exclude

CASENOTES

1981]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Search and Seizure-Evidence
Obtained by Unlawful Police Conduct Shall Not Be
Excluded if the Government Establishes the
Conduct Resulted From a Reasonable, Good
Faith Belief That It Was Proper.
United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
On September 28, 1977, Jo Ann Williams, in violation of her travel restriction,' flew from Los Angeles to Atlanta. Williams was observed deplaning by special agent Markonni of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 2 The agent, aware of the travel restriction placed upon Williams,
approached and questioned her.8 After ascertaining that Williams had no
permission to travel outside the state of Ohio, agent Markonni arrested
Williams for violation of her travel restriction. A search incident to the
arrest resulted in the seizure of a packet of heroin. A search of Williams'
luggage, pursuant to a warrant, resulted in the seizure of a large quantity
of heroin. 4 The district court sustained defendant's motion to suppress all
1. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Williams
previously was arrested by Special Agent Markonni in Ohio for possession of heroin. See id.
at 833. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(B)(10) (1976) (heroin classified as Schedule I drug);
id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (penalties for possession of heroin). Pending appeal of her conviction Williams was released on bond. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1976) (release proper when judicial
officer reasonably assured of appearance); id. § 3148 (release after conviction when appeal
filed). A condition of Williams' release was that she restrict her travel to within the state of
Ohio. See id. § 3146(a)(2) (provides for travel restrictions).
2. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1979). Agent Markonni,
pursuant to the DEA's Drug Courier Interdiction Program, was monitoring passengers deplaning from flights originating in Los Angeles. The Program involved detention and
searches of those individuals fitting a drug courier profile. The profile includes several characteristics including: arrival from or departure to a city identified as a source of drugs; carrying little or no luggage; unusual itinerary; use of an alias; and unusual nervousness. See id.
at 88. But see Reid v. Georgia,

U.S.

-

-,

100 S. Ct. 2752, 2753-54, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890,

-

894-95 (1980) (drug courier profile does not constitute probable cause).
3. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 89 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979) (Markonni informed of restriction by assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio);
cf. United States v. Mendenhall,

-

U.S.

-,

-

100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497,

509 (1980) (mere questioning by officer is not seizure for fourth amendment purposes). See
generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). " 'Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may
we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."' Id. at 19 n.16.
4. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 834 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (affidavit tended to establish probable cause for issuance of search warrant); cf. United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (search of luggage unreasonable without safeguards provided by judicial warrant).
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evidence seized incident to the arrest. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the panel affirmed the trial court.5
The court, on its own motion, granted a rehearing en banc. Held-Reversed. Evidence obtained by unlawful police conduct shall not be excluded if the government establishes the conduct resulted from a reasonable, good faith belief that it was proper.'
In 1914 the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule
as a remedy for unlawful intrusions upon the right of personal privacy
guaranteed by the fourth amendment.7 The possibility of the exclusion of
evidence simply "because the constable blundered" has, however, led to a
detailed analysis of the efficacy of the rule and the right to personal privacy which it protects.8 The problem with the exclusionary rule lies in the
danger of frustrating legitimate law enforcement activities by suppressing
evidence at trial because a police officer failed to comply with the law of
search and seizure, even though such noncompliance resulted from an
honest mistake. In Mapp v. Ohio0 the Court found the possibility of a
criminal going free because a constable blundered preferable to the possi5. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 96 (5th Cir. 1979).
6. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
7. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (exclusionary rule adopted in
federal jurisdiction); U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653-55
(1961) (exclusionary rule applied to states). The exclusionary rule provides that evidence
seized in violation of the constitution is inadmissible at the trial of the accused. See id. at
655.
8. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657
(1926). See generally Wright, Must The Criminal Go Free If The Constable Blunders?, 50
TEXAS L. REV. 736, 738 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960). See
generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.2, at 20-21 (Supp. 1981); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 n.593 (1974); Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CI. L. REV. 665, 667-68 (1970), Comment,
On the Limitations of EmpiricalEvaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the
Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra,69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740, 741-48 (1974). See
also U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO. § 8.02, at 23
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971). The ALI proposal would permit courts to weigh several considerations in determining whether the evidence was seized incident to a substantial violation of

the fourth amendment. See ALI

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO.

§ 8.02, at 23

(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Officers went to the Mapp home to question an individual
believed to be hiding there. The officers broke into the home after Miss Mapp refused to let
them in. A demand to see a search warrant was then made. A paper was produced by an
officer which Miss Mapp grabbed and placed in her bosom. A struggle to retrieve the paper
from Miss Mapp's bosom then occurred. Thereafter she was handcuffed for her belligerence
in resisting the "official rescue" of the paper. A wide ranging search of the premises resulted
in the seizure of some obscene materials. At Miss Mapp's trial for possession of obscene
materials the government failed to produce a search warrant. See id. at 644-45.
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bility of law abiding citizens being subjected to unreasonable searches
and seizures.1 1
Subsequent to the adoption of the exclusionary rule, the need for exceptions to its application was recognized. 12 In Terry v. Ohio's the Court
admitted evidence obtained in an initial police-suspect confrontation despite the absence of probable cause," when the search was for concealed
objects which might be used to assault the police officer."8 When exigent
circumstances foreclose the practicability of obtaining a warrant,"6 the
preference for searches pursuant to a warrant may be outweighed." Other

11. See id. at 659. The Court noted" that to subject law abiding citizens to unreasonable
searches and seizures would result in "contempt for law." See id. at 659.
12. See generally Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "[T]he process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate also in the judicial function." Id. at 408; Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code
of Criminal Procedure,53 CAL. L. Rsv. 929, 952-53 (1965).
13. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry provides that an officer may search for weapons when a
reasonably prudent man in the same circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger. See id. at 27.
14. The test for probable cause is whether at the moment the arrest was made the facts
and circumstances within the knowledge of the police officer were sufficient to warrant a
reasonably prudent man in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing
an offense. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). The test of probable
cause applies to both arrests and searches. See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,
485-86 (1958). Probable cause to arrest or search must precede the search or arrest. See, e.g.,
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968) (officer had no probable cause to search until
search revealed heroin); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959) (arrest not justified
by what subsequent search discloses); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948)
(arrest cannot justify search and at same time search cannot justify arrest).
15. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968)
(companion case to Terry). The arresting officer in Sibron had no grounds to believe that
defendant was armed and dangerous; therefore, the evidence was seized illegally. See Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-65 (1968). Further, the officer had no probable cause to arrest
or search Sibron. See id. at 62-63.
16. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). See generally
Comment, Warrantless Searches-The Worm Has Turned ... Again, 22 BAYLOR L. REv.
39, 40 (1970). To safeguard the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment a
"neutral and detached magistrate" must draw the inferences necessary to determine probable cause, not an officer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (evidence excluded not on basis of
lack of probable cause but on failure to procure warrant).
17. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970) (warrantless search of
automobile justified on basis of inherent mobility of automobile and ease of destruction of
contraband); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1967) (search of house subsequent to
defendant's flight into house); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (blood
test not improper seizure inasmuch as officer was confronted with an emergency which
threatened destruction of evidence). If the arrest occurs in a public place an arrest warrant
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recognized exceptions are based upon the circumstances surrounding the
search' s and upon procedural considerations. 1
is not required. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). Search incident to lawful arrest has
been expanded to include searches incident to lawful custodial arrests. Compare Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (seizure of fruits of crime incident to lawful arrest)
and Dillon v. Obrien, 16 Cox 245, 247 (Ireland Ex. D. 1887) (arrest pursuant to warrant
resulted in seizure of chattels) with Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (defendant arrested and searched for driving without driver's license) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220 (1973) (defendant arrested and searched because arresting officer
knew his driver's license had been revoked).
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and. . . in
the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search to the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable'
search under that Amendment.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). See generally Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (search incident to valid arrest expanded to area within immediate
control of arrestee).
18. These exceptions include:
(1) Plain View. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 235-36 (1968) (registration
card on floor of car within officer's view); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963) (brick
of marijuana on floor within view of officer); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)
(cases of liquor on deck of ship in plain view). The object must appear illegal on its face
before the seizure is lawful. See DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
(red balloon on window sill not evidence of possession of heroin); Nicholas v. State, 502
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)(negatives of illicit sexual behavior not in plain view
of officers inasmuch as they had to be picked up and placed in the light).
(2) Inevitable discovery. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 n.12 (1977) (evidence
although seized unlawfully may be admitted upon proof it would have been discovered eventually). See generally 1 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §
3.3(b), at 3-14 to -17 (2d ed. 1979).
(3) Abandonment. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 505 (1978) (abandonment exception not applicable to search of building by firemen after fire); Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217, 240-41 (1960) (seizure of items left in hotel room by defendant after arrest not
unlawful).
(4) Border searches and seizures. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 555 (1976) (fixed checkpoint); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-87
(1975) (roving patrol); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (roving
patrol). See generally Comment, Almeida-Sanchez and Its Progeny: The Developing Border Zone Search Law, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 214, 219 (1975). A search warrant or probable cause
is not necessary for a valid search at the border. See Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389,
391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 950 (1961).
(5) Illegal Police Actions Attenuated with Effect. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268, 279 (1978) (substantial time elapsed between illegal search and contact with witness);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (narcotics seized by exploitation of
defendant's inadmissible statements). The test of attenuation is whether, granting the primary illegality, the evidence has been discovered as a result of the illegality or instead by
means sufficient enough to be "purged of the primary taint." See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
(6) Administrative searches. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323-24

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol13/iss1/6

4

Berry: Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Police Conduct Shall Not Be Exclude

19811

CASENOTES

Just as the United States Supreme Court has limited the situations in
which the exclusionary rule is applicable, it has also changed its perception of the purpose for the rule. 0 In Elkins v. United States" the Court
recognized deterrence of police misconduct as the major purpose of the
exclusionary rule.22 A second purpose noted in Elkins was the preservation of judicial integrity; specifically, courts cannot allow themselves to
become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a constitution they are
sworn to uphold."" As Justice Brandeis acknowledged in Olmstead v.
United States,2 4 a distinction between the government as prosecutor and
as judge cannot be made; government lawbreaking to convict a criminal
breeds contempt for the law.2 5 Furthermore, Justice Black in Mapp reasoned that the rule was not only justified, but required when the fourth

(1978) (inspection pursuant to OSHA regulations); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)
(inspection pursuant to fire code); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1967)
(inspection pursuant to housing code). See generally 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 231, 233-37 (1979).
(7) Consent. See United States v. Mendenhall, U.S. -,
-,
100 S. Ct. 1870, 1879, 64
L. Ed. 2d 497, 512 (1980) (consent to search freely and voluntarily given); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (knowledge of right to refuse search determines
whether consent voluntary).
(8) Searches by Private Citizens. See, -e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)
(evidence seized by employer and subsequently given to government officials not protected
by fourth amendment); United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 158-59 (4th Cir. 1978) (use
of "spy" attachment to trace telephone calls by telephone company); United States v.
Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1978) (search of apartment for source of leak by
security director lead to discovery of illegal silencers). The application of the exclusionary
rule is also limited by the requirement of standing to suppress the seized evidence. Compare
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 (1978) (exclusionary rule available upon showing of legitimate expectation of privacy) with Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1959) (exclusionary rule automatically available to defendants charged with possessory offense). But see
United States v. Salvucci, U.S ....
100 S. Ct. 2547, 2549, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 623-24
(1980).
19. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-96 (1975) (federal habeas corpus relief foreclosed); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (refusal to suppress evidence
at grand jury proceeding); cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (defendant
cannot claim protection of the exclusionary rule after taking the stand and committing
perjury).
20. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365-66 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
21. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
22. See id. at 217 (purpose of rule is to prevent, not repair).
23. See id. at 223.
24. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face." Id. at 485
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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amendment guarantee of privacy was considered in conjunction with the
fifth amendment proscription against self incrimination."6 The recent
trend of authority, however, bases the existence of the exclusionary rule
solely on the deterrence of police misconduct, thereby limiting the application of the exclusionary rule to situations where a police officer has acted illegally. 7
Some members of the Supreme Court advocate an exception to the exclusionary rule in situations where the constable merely blunders."8 This
exception, termed the "good faith exception" by one commentator,' 9 provides: "that when an officer acts in the good faith belief that his conduct
is constitutional and when he has a reasonable basis for that belief, the
exclusionary rule will not operate."8 0 The proposed good faith exception
actually applies to two separate and distinct situations.3 1 The "technical
violation" facet applies to a situation in which an officer has acted pursuant to a statute found unconstitutional, a warrant found invalid, or court
precedent overruled. 8' The "good faith mistake" facet applies when the
officer acts pursuant to a good faith belief that probable cause exists, but
due to an error in judgment the officer did not actually have probable
88

cause.

Authority for the technical violation facet is found in Michigan v.
8 wherein the defendant was arrested and searched pursuant
DeFillippo
to an ordinance which made it unlawful to refuse to identify oneself to a

26. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); U.S. CONST.
amends. IV & V. But see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976) (fifth amendment
adheres only to person, not places).
27. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) (deterrence not furthered when statute found unconstitutional); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56
(1979) (deterence not applicable to regulatory violation); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134
n.3 (1978) (aim of exclusion is deterrence). But see United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741,
770 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (judicial integrity recognized). See generally Ball, Good
Faith And The Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception To The Exclusionary
Rule, 69 J. CRiM. L. C. 635, 649 (1978).
28. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 536 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring; White,
J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 442 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); United
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-38 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., writing for the majority).
29. See Ball, Good Faith And The Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception
To The Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. Cram. L C. 635, 635 (1978).
30. Id. at 653; see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
31. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540-41 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Ball, Good
Faith And The Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception To The Exclusionary
Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. C., 635, 635-36 (1978).
32. Ball, Good Faith And The Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception To
The Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. Cram. L. C. 635, 635-36 (1978).
33. Id. at 635.
34. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
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police officer.35 The DeFillippo Court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional, but admitted the fruits of the search.3 In so holding, the Court
relied on the Fifth Circuit cases of United States v.Carden7 and United
States v. Kilgen."8 The court in Carden and Kilgen held that an arrest
and subsequent search made in good faith reliance upon a statute not yet
found unconstitutional
is valid notwithstanding the actual constitutional3
9
statute.
the
of
ity
The technical violation facet is also supported by the decision in
0 where the court rejected defendant's allegation
United States v. Woais4
that his arrest violated the Posse Comitatus Act.4

'

The Wolfs court

ruled, without actually deciding whether the Posse Comitatus Act was violated, that if the Act was violated it was an isolated instance and not the
result of intentional police misconduct."' Moreover, in United States v.
Hill 3 the court rejected defendant's argument that a magistrate cannot
with oral testimony rehabilitate a search warrant, deficient on its face."
The Hill court reasoned that the only error attributable to the procedure
followed by the magistrate was a technical one, which in no way justified
the exclusion of the evidence.45 Furthermore, in United States v. Peltier"

35. See id. at 33. See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979) (statute provided for
arrest for refusing to identify oneself to police officer).
36. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979). The Court distinguishes DeFillippo from cases where there was no probable cause. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442
U.S. 465, 471 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 255, 269-72 (1973); Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968).
37. 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976) (ordinance against loitering).
38. 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971) (vagrancy ordinance).
39. See United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848
(1976); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
41. See id. at 85 (exclusionary rule not warranted in isolated violation of Posse Comitatus Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1976) (no part of the Army or Air Force to be used as posse
comitatus to execute laws).
42. See United States v. Wolfs, 594 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979); accord, United States
v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974); State v. Danko,
548 P.2d 819, 825 (Kan. 1976).
43. 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
44. See id. at 320. The Hill court found the affidavit plus the oral testimony of the
affiant sufficient to satisfy the requirements of probable cause to search. See id. at 316-20.
The defendant contended that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not permit the
magistrate to cure a defective affidavit with oral testimony. See id. at 320; FzD. R. CriM. P.
41(c)(2) (authorizes issuance of warrant on affiant's oral testimony so long as magistrate
determines probable cause exists). The Hill court rejected defendant's argument on the
ground that supplementation was permissible. See United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315, 321
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
45. See United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
931 (1975).
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the Court refused to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a statute subsequently determined unconstitutional by officers who did not have
knowledge or could not be charged with knowledge that the search they
47
executed was unconstitutional.
Support for the good faith mistake facet is found in Justice White's
dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell."s Justice White reasoned that when
the Supreme Court itself divides five to four on the issue of probable
cause, to hold that the arresting officer did not have probable cause would
be untenable.' Additionally, when an officer acts with a reasonable, good
faith, albeit mistaken, belief that he had probable cause to arrest or
search, the exclusion of evidence as a result of the search has no deterrent
effect,5° and the public interest of fighting crime is frustrated.5 1 In support of the good faith mistake facet Justice White relied on cases which
do not hold a policeman or public official liable for actions taken in the
furtherance of their official positions when those actions are reasonable
and in good faith.2 United States v. Janis5" further supports the good
faith mistake facet. In Janis the Court refused to extend the exclusionary
rule to a civil case when the seizing officers acted
pursuant to a warrant
5
which was defective for lack of probable cause. '
In United States v. Williams" the majority in the first part of a two

46. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
47. See id. at 542. The Peltier Court refused to give retroactive effect to an earlier
Supreme Court decision which invalidated warrantless searches on less than probable cause
within one hundred miles of the border. See id. at 534-35; Alemeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (statute authorizing warrantless searches within 100 miles of
border on less than probable cause found unconstitutional). See also Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (analysis of good faith and technical violations of fifth amendment).
48. 428 U.S. 465, 536-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
52. Compare Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974) (action against the Governor of Ohio for deploying National Guard on the Kent State Campus resulting in death of
plaintiffs' decedents) with Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (action against police
officer for false arrest). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (action
against state hospital superintendant for deprivation of constitutional right to liberty);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (action against school officials for violating
right of due process).
53. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
54. See id. at 335-36 n.1. See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-16 (1964). The Janis Court noted the good faith of the
seizing officers. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453 (1976); cf. Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1974) (failure to give proper Miranda warnings not fatal inasmuch as
officers acted in good faith).
55. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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part opinion"6 found the arresting officer had authority to arrest Williams
and, therefore, refused to consider the applicability of the exclusionary

rule.57 The court concluded that Williams' breach of a court order restricting travel constituted criminal contempt pursuant to section 401(3)

of title 18 of the United States Code.58 Recognizing that disobedience of a
court order constituted contempt, 5 ' the court relied on a series of cases

which held contempt to be a crime." Finding that the crime of criminal
contempt occurs at the time of the contumacious act," the court concluded that agent Markonni had authority to arrest Williams pursuant to
section 878(3) of title 21 of the United States Code.' Insofar as the arrest
of Williams was authorized the court concluded the search incident to the
arrest was lawful."
The second part of the two part opinion, without determining whether
the agent had lawful authority to arrest Williams, found both facets of
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applicable.6 4 The court

56. See id. at 833. The Williams court in an unusual per curiam opinion adopted alternative resolutions, termed Part I and Part II, for the disposition of the instant case. See id.
at 833.
57. See id. at 839. The court also dismissed the Miranda issue raised sua sponte in the
panel's opinion. See id. at 839; United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 92 n.12 (5th Cir.
1979).
58. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (punishment for violating lawful court order); 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976) (punishment of contempt
by fine or imprisonment).
59. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). See
generally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 124 (1st Am. Ed.
1959).
60. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); see, e.g.,
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (petition to admit false will); Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 167-79 (1958) (failure to surrender to U.S. Marshall after violation of
Smith Act); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1914) (violation of injunction).
61. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 838 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); cf.
United States v. Morales, 566 F.2d 402, 404 (2nd Cir. 1977) (contempt charge initiated by
grand jury). See generally Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943) (limitation
statute runs when contumacious act occurs).
62. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); 21
U.S.C. § 878(3)(A)-(B)(1976). DEA agent can make an arrest without a warrant "for any
offense against the United States committed in his presence, or ... for any felony, cognizable under the laws of the United States, if he has probable cause to believe that the person
to be.arrested has committed or is committing a felony." 21 U.S.C. § 878(3)(A)-(B) (1976).
See also United States v. Avery, 447 F.2d 978, 979 (4th Cir. 1971) (defendant arrested for
violation of travel restriction), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972).
63. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Agent
Markonni had to obtain a search warrant to search Williams' luggage. See Chadwick v.
United States, 433 U.S. 1, 16 (1977).
64. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Part II
majority includes three judges who joined the Part I majority). The technical violation facet
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concluded that evidence will not be excluded when it is discovered by
agents in the course of actions taken in good faith with the reasonable
belief that the conduct was authorized." The court, however, recognized
the good faith exception not as a rule separate and distinct from the exclusionary rationale but merely as an exception thereto."6 Emphasizing
that an agent's belief must be held in subjective good faith and grounded
in objective reasonableness,6 7 the court found the good faith mistake facet
applicable inasmuch as agent Markonni had made a factual error es concerning an element of the crime of violating a travel restriction." Recognizing that it was reasonable for agent Markonni to rely upon section
3146 of title 18 of the United States Code to arrest Williams, the court
concluded the technical facet was applicable.7 0 The court justified application of the good faith exception on the premise that the sole basis for
excluding evidence is to deter police misconduct."
The effect of the second part of the Williams opinion is to establish a
new exception to the exclusionary rule in the Fifth Circuit.72 As defined

applies to situations when an officer has acted pursuant to a statute found unconstitutional,
a warrant found invalid, or court precedent overruled. See id. at 841 (quoting Ball, Good
Faith And The Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception To The Exclusionary
Rule, 69 J. Caim. L. C. 635, 635 (1978)). The good faith mistake facet applies when an officer
has acted pursuant to a good faith belief that probable cause exists but due to an error in
judgment the officer did not actually have probable cause. See United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (quoting Ball, Good Faith And The Fourth
Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception To The Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. C.
635, 635 (1978)).
65. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (quoting
Ball, Good Faith And The Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception To The Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. C. 635, 635 (1978)).
66. See id. at 840. Analytically, the court reasoned, whether the good faith rationale
was applied as an exception to the exclusionary rule or as a doctrine beyond its reach did
not make a difference. See id. at 840.
67. See id. at 841 n.4. "[T]he belief ... must... be based upon articulable premises
sufficient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to believe he was acting lawfully." Id. at 841 n.4a.
68. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1979) (determination of
whether defendant violated travel restriction by judicial officer); 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976)
(travel restrictions).
69. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (violation
of travel restrictions occurs only when defendant misses court appearance); 18 U.S.C. § 3146
(1976) (travel restrictions while defendant is free on bond pending appeal of his conviction).
70. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); 18
U.S.C. § 3146 (1976). The panel construed the statute as providing no authority for a DEA
agent to arrest a defendant for violation of travel restrictions. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 94 (5th Cir. 1979).
71. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 847 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
72. See id. at 840. Evidence obtained by unlawful police conduct shall not be excluded
if the government establishes the conduct resulted from a reasonable good faith belief the
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by the en banc court, however, the exception cannot justifiably be applied
to the facts of the instant case.78 Before an exception to the exclusionary
rule is necessary, there must be a determination as to whether the evidence was obtained lawfully. 74 As the lawfulness of Williams' arrest was
not doubted by any of the judges on the court,78 the question of adopting
and applying 76a new exception to the exclusionary rule need never have
been reached.
In adopting the good faith exception in Williams, the court relied on
the fact that four Supreme Court Justices have advocated a similar exception; 77 however, a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to adopt an

conduct was proper. Id. at 840.
73. See id. at 837. In the first part of Williams the court finds that violation of a travel
restriction is a criminal offense. This finding is supported by the weight of authority. See id.
at 837; cf., e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) ("criminal contempt is a crime");
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 173 (1958) ("bail-jumping" constitutes criminal contempt); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1914) (contempt is a criminal act).
A construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3150 which defines penalties for failure to appear before the
court as applying to the violation of any lawful court order is justified by a literal reading of
18 U.S.C. § 401(3). See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 173 (1958) ("bail-jumping"
constitutes criminal contempt); 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976) ($5,000 fine and/or 5 years in prison
if released pending appeal of felony); id. § 401(3) (court has power to punish disobedience or
resistance to a lawful court order). Since the purpose of placing a travel restriction on a
defendant pending appeal is to assure his appearance in court, see 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(b)
(1976), violation of the restriction is a violation of the court order and, therefore, a contumacious act. It is logically consistent to find that contempt occurs at the time of the contumacious act in light of previous decisions which held the statute of limitations runs when the
contumacious act is committed. See also Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418
(1943). When agent Markonni determined that Williams had violated her travel restriction,
therefore, she had committed an offense against the United States. Agent Markonni had
authority to search Williams as an incident to lawful arrest. See United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (search incident to lawful custodial arrest is reasonable under
fourth amendment). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 878(3)(A)-(B) (1976) (DEA agent has authority to make arrest without warrant when offense against the United States committed in his
presence). Due to the fact Williams was about to board another plane the exigencies of the
situation foreclosed obtaining of an arrest warrant. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d
86, 89 (5th Cir. 1979).
74. See United States v. Peabody, 626 F.2d 1300, 1301 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (search was
authorized); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (arrest
authorized; therefore, no need for exclusionary rule rationale).
75. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 848 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Rubin,
J., concurring).
76. See id. at 839, 848 (Rubin, J., concurring); cf. United States v. Peabody, 626 F.2d
1300, 1301 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (search authorized; good faith exception unnecessary).
77. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); see Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 538 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring; White, J., dissenting); Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Peltier v. United States, 422
U.S. 531, 535-38 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., writing for the majority).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 13 [2022], No. 1, Art. 6

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

7
exception based upon good faiths.
Furthermore, the Williams court justified the adoption of the good faith exception on the premise that the exception is similar to other recognized exceptions.7 9 Williams, however, focuses on the subjective good faith belief of the agent, whereas other
recognized exclusionary rule exceptions are based upon concerns for an
efficient system of criminal justice,80 the circumstances surrounding the
82
arrest or search,8" or the integrity of the trial.
Even if the good faith exception was a relevant consideration in the
second part of Williams, the court misapplied both the technical violation
and good faith mistake facets in the instant case.8" The first part of the
majority's opinion, which held there was a legal arrest, pretermitted application of the technical violation facet. 4 Although the Williams panel
found that section 3146 of title 18 of the United States Code did not
authorize Williams' arrest, this finding should not have triggered the application of the technical violation facet because the first part of Williams
determined that section 3146 of title 18 of the United States Code authorized the arrest. 85 Further, there was no technical violation as defined

78. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 538 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring; White,
J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Peltier
v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 535-38 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., writing for the majority).
79. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 842-43 (1980) (en banc). The court
equates the good faith exception to the recognized exceptions of: (1) illegal police actions
attenuated with effect; (2) federal habeas corpus relief; (3) grand jury proceedings; and (4)
impeachment. Id. at 842-43.
80. Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (preclusion of habeas corpus
relief on basis of promoting "rational system of justice") and United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (excluding evidence from grand jury would curtail its investigatory
function) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (determination of good faith belief of police officer in his conduct).
81. Compare United States. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1978) (recognition of
important interplay between police officer and arrestee in conjunction with fifth amendment
issues of waiver and consent) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir.
1980) (en banc) (determination of good faith belief of police officer in his conduct).
82. Compare Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (defendant cannot commit perjury and then claim protection of exclusionary rule) with United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1980) (good faith of police officer).
83. Compare Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (good faith reliance by
officer on unconstitutional statute) and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White,
J., dissenting) (good faith belief in probable cause) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d
830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (agent's conduct was lawful).
84. Compare United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(arrest was authorized; therefore, no need to apply exclusionary rationale) with id. at 846
(technical violation facet of good faith exception applicable).
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976) (travel restrictions). Compare Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (reliance on unconstitutional statute) and United States v. Williams,
594 F.2d 86, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1979) (section 3146 does not authorize arrest) with United
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (section 3146 authorized
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by the second part of Williams inasmuch as the agent must have relied
upon a statute, warrant, or court precedent subsequently modified to
make his conduct unauthorized."s The good faith mistake facet is also not
applicable because the first part of Williams found probable cause for the
arrest.87 Moreover, the court in Williams did not analyze the subjective
good faith and objective reasonableness of the agent's belief,8 but simply
concluded that his mental state at the time of the arrest met these prerequisites." Finally, both facets of the exception are not applicable in
Williams because Williams does not present the situation where an agent
acts pursuant to a statute, court precedent, or warrant subsequently modified to render the agent's conduct unlawful, and such acts are taken on
the basis of a reasonable, but mistaken belief in probable cause.' 0
Authority cited by Williams in support of the technical violation facet
only supports the application of this facet in situations where a statute
subsequently is found unconstitutional.' Williams, however, held that

arrest) and United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (agent's
reliance on section 3146 to authorize arrest). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976) (travel
restrictions).
86. Compare Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (ordinance relied upon by
officer unconstitutional) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (statute authorized agent's conduct).
87. Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (good
faith belief in probable cause) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir.
1980) (en banc) (agent possessed knowledge that defendant committed offense against
United States in the agent's presence). See 21 U.S.C. 878(3)(A) (1976) (codification of probable cause).
88. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 n.4a (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
"[T]he belief, in addition to being held in subjective good faith, must be grounded in reasonableness." Id. at 841 n.4a. "It must therefore be based upon articulable premises sufficient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained officer to believe that he was acting
lawfully." Id. at 841 n.4a. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("good faith belief conduct comported with existing law and reasonable grounds
for that belief").
89. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). The
mental state of the arresting officer would be explored at the suppression hearing. See id. at
850-51. (Rubin J., concurring). A reasonable interpretation of section 3146 gives an agent
authority to arrest an individual for violating a travel restriction. See id. at 846; United
States v. Avery, 447 F.2d 978, 979 (4th Cir. 1971) (arrest of defendant prior to judicial determination of contempt), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972); 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2) (1976)
(travel restrictions).
90. Compare Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (good faith reliance by
officer on unconstitutional statute) and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White,
J., dissenting) (good faith belief in probable cause) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d
830, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (statute authorized agent to make arrest, and probable
cause existed for arrest).
91. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979) (ordinance gave authority
to officers to arrest for refusal to identify oneself); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542
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the technical violation facet is also applicable to situations where judicial
precedent is overruled, or a warrant is invalidated, thereby apparently
extending the application of the technical violation facet without relying
upon prior case law.98
The authority cited by Williams to support the good faith mistake
facet is either distinguishable or actually supports the technical violation
facet.' 8 The reliance on Janis is not justified because the Janis court was
faced with the issue of extending the exclusionary rule to a civil case, not
the issue of the officer's good faith belief in the existence of probable
cause." Williams also relied on Hill for support of the good faith mistake
facet.95 Such reliance is misplaced because Hill was concerned with the
issue of a technical defect in a warrant and not the issue of an officer's
belief in probable cause." Hill, therefore, supports the technical violation
facet of the good faith exception as it is applied to technical defects in
warrants and not the good faith mistake facet as asserted by the second
part of Williams.'7 Reliance by the majority in Williams upon Wolffs as

(1975) (border searches authorized within 100 miles); United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443,
444 (5th Cir. 1976) (loitering ordinance); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir.
1971 (vagrancy ordinance). See generally United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 843-44
(5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
92. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
93. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979) (bar patron subjected to full
search even though officers purportedly carried out Terry search); United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 434-41 (1976) (extension of exclusionary rule to civil proceedings); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1974) (improper Miranda warnings); United States v. Wolffs,
594 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979) (violation of Posse Comitatus Act); United States v. Hill, 500
F.2d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 1974) (rehabilitating defective warrant with oral testimony), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975). The Williams court itself distinguishes Ybarra v. Illinois on the
basis that the exclusion of evidence without any probable cause is entirely different from
exclusion of evidence based upon a good faith belief in probable cause. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846 (5th Cir.
1980) (en banc). The Ybarra Court specifically noted that its decision was not contrary to
DeFillippo.Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979); see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 33 (1979).
94. Compare United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 434-41 (1976) (extending exclusionary rule to civil case) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 80, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (agent's good faith belief in presence or absence of probable cause).
95. See Williams v. United States, 622 F.2d 830, 845 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); United
States v. Hill, 550 F.2d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
96. Compare United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(good faith mistake exception applies when officer has reasonable good faith belief in probable cause) with United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315, 316-20 (5th Cir. 1974) (error in rehabilitating deficient warrant was technical), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 931 (1975).
97. See United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
931 (1975). The Hill court stated in an alternative holding that if there was an error in the
procedure followed by the magistrate in rehabilitating a deficient warrant with oral testimony it was a technical one. See id. at 322.
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support for the good faith mistake facet is also not warranted. The court's

refusal to exclude evidence in Wolffs was not based on the officer's good
faith belief in the existence of probable cause, rather, it was based on the
court's finding that a technical violation of the Posse Commitatus Act

was insufficient grounds for exclusion."
The effect of the adoption of the technical violation facet at this point
in its development, however, is speculative. Legislatures, aware of Williams, and in an effort to curtail rising crime, may not be as careful in

drafting statutes and ordinances to conform with recognized constitutional guarantees because evidence seized pursuant to such a statute

would be admissible at trial until the statute was declared unconstitutional.9 9 The lack of the fourth amendment requirement for reasonableness in such legislation may lead a court which had adopted the technical
violation facet to reevaluate its holding. 10 0 In such a situation the court

would be concerned with deterring legislative not police misconduct. 10 1
Conversely, the mistaken belief facet is without justifiable support. The
Supreme Court has defined the reasonableness of a search by the objective test of probable cause.108 In Henry v. United States0 8 the Court specifically stated that subjective good faith was not enough.'0 4 Even evalu-

ated by a standard of reasonableness, the good faith test does not meet
the criterion of whether a reasonably prudent man would believe that the
defendant had committed or was committing an offense. 08 Moreover,
98. Compare United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(mistaken belief facet applies to situations where police officer makes judgmental error as to
existence of probable cause) with United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979)
(exclusion of evidence if Posse Comitatus Act violations become widespread).
99. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979) (fruits of search admissible at
trial though statute found unconstitutional); cf. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49-53 (1979)
(search pursuant to unconstitutional statute revealed no illegality). See also Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959) (arrest not justified by what the subsequent search
discloses).
100. Compare Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49-53 (1979) (search pursuant to unconstitutional statute revealed no illegality) with Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979)
(search pursuant to unconstitutional statute revealed illegality). See also Reid v. Georgia,
U.S. 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 895 (1980) (conclusion that drug
courier profile justified seizure subjects presumably innocent travelers to random searches).
101. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 45 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("legislative legerdemain"); cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (major purpose
of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct).
102. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
103. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
104. See id. at 102.
105. Compare United States v. Mendenhall, -, U.S.
100 S. Ct. 1870, 1875, 64
L. Ed. 2d 497, 507 (1980) (requirement that searches and seizures be based upon objective
justification) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
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there is the possibility that adoption of this facet will actually encourage
police ignorance of lawful conduct by allowing them to rely on their subjective good faith in the propriety of their conduct.'06 Instead of encouraging this type of situation courts must delineate with more specificity
the guidelines of an officer's authority. 101
The failure of the second part of Williams to address the issue of
whether the agent had actual, lawful authority to arrest Williams indicates that the court is not adopting an exception to the exclusionary rule
as the court states, but a rule separate and distinct.1 8 Subsequently, discussing the good faith exception in United States v. Peabody,10 9 the Fifth
Circuit, in dictum, noted that the arresting officers had authority to
search and, therefore, the good faith exception adopted in Williams need
not have been considered.110 The dictum of Peabody, however, is inconclusive as to the issue of whether a court must first determine if there was
a lack of authority to arrest or search before a determination can be made
as to the applicability of the good faith exception."1 Jurists, therefore,
must await another case to correctly apply the good faith exception
adopted in Williams.
In cases where there has been a conviction based upon a statute or ordinance found unconstitutional, a court should be cognizant of the possibility these laws were enacted as a ruse to harass, arrest, and convict an
undesirable element of society. The technical violation facet, however, is

(good faith mistake as to whether there was probable cause).
106. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 850 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(Rubin, J., concurring). "A policeman who is in complete subjective good faith is unlikely to
stop and ask himself, 'Am I also reasonable?"' Id. at 850 n.4.
107. Cf. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979) ("enactment of a law forecloses
speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality ...").
108. Compare United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 833-39 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(agent had authority to arrest; therefore, exclusionary rule not applicable) with id. at 840-47
(issue is whether agent had good faith and reasonable belief in authority).
109. 626 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
110. See id. at 1301 n.1. The Coast Guard officer boarded defendant's yacht outside the
territorial limits of the United States to inspect the safety and documentation of the yacht.
See id. at 1301 n.1. During the inspection the officer discovered contraband in plain view.
Id. at 1301 n.1. "Had he taken unauthorized action, his good faith in doing so and the
reasonableness of his belief that his actions were authorized, if they occurred today, would
be relevant to our inquiry." Id. at 1301 n.1; see United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840
(5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Since the officer's actions were authorized there is no need to
examine the officer's good faith. See United States v. Peabody, 626 F.2d 1300, 1301 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1980).
111. Compare United States v. Peabody, 626 F.2d 1300, 1301 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (actions authorized; no need to reach good faith issue) with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d
830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (good faith is issue). Three judges concur in Parts I and II
of Williams. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 833, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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supported by authority and should be expressly adopted by the Supreme
Court.""2 One caveat need be added regarding situations involving warrants: if the warrant is defective for lack of probable cause the defect is
not technical and the exclusionary rule is applicable.112 Insofar as the
mistaken belief facet does not meet the objective reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment it should not be adopted at all.11 To
query the reasonable good faith belief of the arresting officer begs the
question of whether there was probable cause ab initio.15 If the officer
did not have probable cause his actions were unlawful and should not be
condoned in an effort to make law enforcement more effective. The warning of Justice Brandeis in Olrnstead still need be heeded, "to declare that
the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal-would bring terrible retribution."11 6 To allow the courts
to redefine probable cause is but one step closer to the retribution forewarned by Justice Brandeis.117
John W. Berry

112. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 33 (1979) (ordinance providing for
stop and question further provided for arrest upon refusal to comply); United States v.
Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 444 (5th Cir.) (ordinance against loitering), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848
(1976); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1971) (vagrancy ordinance).
113. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564-69 (1971); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 115-16 (1964).
114. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)(objective test of probable case); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)(good faith not enough); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)("the rule of probable cause is a practical nontechnical conception"); U.S. CONST amend. IV (no warrant issued without probable cause).
115. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
116. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
117. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can "seize" and "search" him in their
discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after
a full debate by the people of this country.
Id. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

